JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. anid results of expected utility analysis do not depend on the independenec axiom, bLut may be derived from the much weaker assumption of smoothness of preferences over alternative probability distributions. The second purpose of the paper is to show that this approach may be used to construct a simple model of preferences which ties together a wide body of observed behavior toward risk, including the Friedman-Savage and Markowitz observations, and both the Allais and St. Petersburg Paradoxes.
robust are the concepts, tools, and results of expected utility theory to failures of the independence axiom?"
The first purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that expected utility analysis is in fact quite robust to failures of the independence axiom. Specifically, it is shown that, far from depending on the independence axiom (i.e. linearity of the preference functional), the basic concepts, tools, and results of expected utility analysis may be derived by merely assuming smoothness of preferences (i.e. that the preference functional is differentiable in the appropriate sense). This implies that while the independence axiom, and hence the expected utility hypothesis, may not be empirically valid, the implications and predictions of theoretical studies which use expected utility analysis typically will be valid, provided preferences are smooth. Several such results, including the Arrow-Pratt theorem, are formally proven for the general case of smooth preferences.
The second purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that this general analytic approach, termed "generalized expected utility analysis," may be used to construct a simple, yet evidently quite powerful model of individual behavior toward risk. Specifically, it is shown that two simple hypotheses concerning the shape of a fixed nonlinear preference functional over probability distributions serve to generate predictions consistent with (i) the typical behavior exhibited in the Allais Paradox, (ii) other experimental evidence regarding systematic violations of the independence axiom, (iii) the general observations on insurance and lotteries made by Friedman and Savage in their classic article on the expected utility hypothesis, (iv) the subsequent observation by Markowitz and others that preferences over alternative gambles are relatively independent of the level of current wealth (and hence that utility functions apparently shift when wealth changes), and (v) the typical behavior exhibited in the St. Petersburg Paradox and its generalizations. Thus, a number of seemingly unrelated aspects of behavior toward risk are seen to be jointly consistent with the hypothesis that the individual is maximizing a fixed preference functional defined over distributions, which in addition is particularly simple in shape. Section 2 of this paper offers a historical overview of the expected utility model as a descriptive model, treating each of the above five behavioral observations, and discussing the various, and often ad hoc, modifications of the model which have been made to account for some of them. The applications of the tools and theorems of expected utility theory to the analysis of general nonlinear preference functionals is developed in Section 3. In Section 4 this approach is used to construct a simple model of preferences which is consistent with (and in some cases predicts) each of the above five aspects of behavior. Among other things, it is argued that this model offers (i) a simple characterization of the exact nature of observed violations of the independence axiom, (ii) a reconciliation of the relative independence of gambling behavior to current wealth with the hypothesis of a fixed preference ranking of probability distributions over ultimate wealth, and (iii) a resolution of the debate in the expected utility literature concerning the boundedness of the utility function. The paper concludes (Section 5) with some brief remarks on the topics of testing the model and applications of the analysis to the study of social welfare functionals.
EXPECTED UTILITY MAXIMIZATION AS A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL
In this section we consider several classes of observations concerning individual preferences over risky prospects, and give an account of how the expected utility model has been used, and in some cases adapted and modified, to account for these various types of behavior.
Insurance, Lotteries, Skewness Preference, and the Friedman-Savage Hypothesis
The primary motivation for the classic article by Friedman and Savage [33] came from their observations that "the empirical evidence for the willingness of persons of all income classes to buy insurance is extensive" [33, p. 285, or 91, p. 66], that "the empirical evidence for the willingness of individuals to purchase lottery tickets, or engage in similar forms of gambling, is also extensive" [33, p. 286, or 91, p. 67], and their belief that a large number of individuals purchase both.9 They offer as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function which explains these particular observations one which has the form shown in Figure 1 . The key aspect of such a utility function is that it is concave, and hence locally risk averse, about low outcome levels (i.e. low levels of ultimate wealth), linear (to a second order approximation) and hence locally risk neutral at the inflection point, and convex (locally risk loving) for high outcome values.'0 In addition to its well known implications concerning the purchase of insurance and lottery tickets, another implication of the utility function of Figure 1 , noted by Markowitz [60, p. 156], is that an individual with such a utility function will tend to prefer positively skewed distributions (ones with large right tails) over negatively skewed ones (ones with large left tails). The purchase of a lottery ticket, for example, induces a positively skewed distribution if initial wealth was certain, and insuring against a small probability-low outcome event transforms a negatively skewed distribution into a symmetric (certain) one. Since a mean preserving increase in risk (see [74] ) which is "centered" in the upper tail of a symmetric distribution induces positive skewness, and one which is centered in the lower tail induces negative skewness, a preference for positive over negative skewness suggests that the individual will tend to prefer increases in risk in the upper tail of a given initial distribution of wealth over equivalent risk increases in the lower tail. Such a tendency is clearly an implication of the utility function of Figure 1 .
The notion of a relative preference for (equivalently, a lower aversion to) risk increases in the upper rather than the lower tail of an initial distribution may be formalized by adopting the following definition: 1t is important to distinguish between this behavioral principle and the Kahneman and Tversky "reflection effect" [46, pp. 268-269], which states that the preference ranking over a pair of prospects (defined in terms of gains and losses) reverses when all the outcome values are reversed in sign. Since such an effect concerns the relative rankings within two distinct pairs of prospects, and since any spread of probability mass relating the initial pair of prospects is itself "reflected," it is quite distinct from the present principle, which concerns the ranking of a single pair of prospects, each of which is obtained from a given initial distribution by a spread which, though horizontally translated, is not , subjects were asked to leave written instructions to an "agent" who would be faced with a sequence of gambling opportunities in their absence. Although these instructions were predominantly risk averse, they frequently suggested that the agent play more liberally when doing well. In other words, there were some gambles the agent was instructed always to take, and some, never to take. Such a policy would result in some particular distribution of winnings. The designation of additional gambles which should be taken only if cumulative winnings have been high enough indicates that there are some further increases in risk which would be preferred if they occurred in the upper tail of this distribution, but not preferred if they occurred in the lower tail. '4Strictly speaking, the terminal segment must be sufficiently concave (see [33, n. 34]). t5Markowitz [60] subsequently modified the theory further by adding a third inflection point to the left of the first one, since "the individual generally will prefer one chance in ten of owing $10,000,000 rather than owing $1,000,000 for sure" [60, p. 154]. Thus, the amount the individual would pay to avoid a 1/n chance of losing $nZ may similarly eventually decline in n. An alternative explanation is that the individual views the actual consequences of owing either amount as identical (i.e. total bankruptcy) and simply acts to minimize the probability of this common outcome. A second objection to the utility function of Figure 1 comes from the typical response to the famous "St. Petersburg Paradox" and its generalizations.'6 The original form of this paradox was the observation that an individual typically would never forgo a significant amount of wealth to engage in the gamble which offered a payoff of $2i' with probability 2-for i = 1,2, . . .even though the expected winnings from this gamble are infinite. Since an individual with a Figure 1 utility function clearly would forgo any finite sure level of wealth to take this gamble, such a utility function must be abandoned as unrealistic. In his classic article, Menger [63] generalized the paradox by showing that whenever the utility function was unbounded, similar gambles could be constructed which also had infinite certainty equivalents,'7 so that the utility function of Figure 2 behavior may be demonstrated even if only distributions with finite numbers of outcomes are considered. The simplest such instance is the implication that, if utility is unbounded, for any arbitrarily large amount $C and arbitrarily small positive probability p, there will always be sotme amount $Z such that the individual will prefer a p chance of winning $Z to a certain gain of $C.
U(x)
The evidence thus suggests that the utility function of Figure I must be replaced by one as in Figure 2 , that U() must be bounded, and furthermore that the second inflection point must occur at an empirically relevant outcome level.'9 Although such restrictions are necessary to make the expected utility model consistent with the observations considered above, they reduce the elegance with which the observations of Section 2.1 were modelled by the utility function of Figure 1 . In particular, the degree of risk aversion is no longer monotonic in the outcome level. Thus, for example, a Mosteller-Nogee subject with a Figure 2 utility function would instruct an agent to play more liberally when doing well, provided winnings have not been too high, and, if playing conservatively at this high wealth level results in sufficient losses, more liberal gambles ought once again to be taken.
The Relative Invarianice of Gambling Behavior to Initial Wealth and the Markovitz Hypothesis
The next objection to (and modification of) the original Friedman-Savage utility function concerned not so much the typical shape of the utility function, but rather the more fundamental issue of the stability of preferences. Recall that the independence axiom, in conjunction with the other axioms of expected utility theory (see, for example, Herstein and Milnor [43] ) implies that the preference ranking corresponds to the expectation of a fixed utility function defined over final consequences, or in other words, ultimate levels of wealth. Indeed, Friedman and Savagc, in their discussion of the standard method of estimating the utility function by fixing its values at two arbitrary wealth levels, pointed out that the cxpcctcd utility hypothesis would be violated if the usc of another pair of wealth levels as reference points "yielded a utility function differing in more than origin and unit of measure from the one initially obtained" [33, p. 292, or 91, pp. 77--781. Thus, when faced with alternative gambles, that is, prospects expressed in terms of deviations from current wealth, the individual will choose that gamble whose implied distribution over ultimate wealth levels has the highest expected utility.-') This procedure of "integrating" (i.e. convoluting) alternative gambles with initial wealth before ranking is referred to by Kahneman and Tversky as ~'asset integration" [46, p. 264].
"'Stiolitz [92] has argued that the requirement of boundedness does not rule out the case of U(x ) being convex for all x less than a trillion dollars. If such were the case, however, we would not observe lotteries offering multiple prizes of values less than this amount, nor would the individual's valuation of a l/n chance of $n start declining until n were at least one trillion. 20 However, as noted by Markowitz [60] , the assumption that the utility function of Figure 2 is defined over ultimate wealth levels is not consistent with the observed tendency of individuals of all wealth levels to purchase insurance and lottery tickets.2' Individuals with wealth levels less than c ("poor") or greater than d ("well to do") would never accept any fair bets, for example, yet "even poor people, apparently as much as others, buy sweepstakes tickets, play the horses, and participate in other forms of gambling. Rich people play roulette and the stock market" [ The experimental evidence similarly suggests that individual gambling behavior at different initial wealth levels is more indicative of a shifting utility function than of movements along a fixed utility function. In reestimating the "utility curves" of subjects after periods of a few days to several weeks (during which thcir wealth must surely have changed by amounts greater than those involved in the experiment), Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel found that seven of their eight subjects "gave responses which were substantially consistent with the original results" and that three of them "performed the rather astonishing feat of exactly duplicating their first choices (they were given no hint as to what their earlier choices had been)" [ The Markowitz hypothesis of a shifting utility function implies that changes in initial wealth essentially cause the individual to go back and rerank the entire "consumption set" of distributions over ultimate wealth levels. Such a hypothesis, asserting that preferences cannot be defined independently of the current consumption point is, in the words of Eden, "disturbing to economists who use the assumption of 'constant tastes' quite heavily . . . it is hard to see how positive economics can do without this assumption and it is almost impossible to think of welfare economics without it" [20, p. 125]. While the phenomenon of a relative invariance of gambling behavior to initial wealth, and in particular a simultaneous propensity to insure, buy lottery tickets, and avoid symmetric bets at all wealth levels may well contradict the joint hypothesis of constant tastes and expected utility maximization, such behavior (including the insurance-lotteriessymmetric bets observation) is not incompatible with the existence of any fixed preference ranking over ultimate wealth distributions, as will be shown in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 below. Thus, before dropping the assumption of constant tastes in order to save the assumption that the individual is maximizing the expectation of some utility function at each initial wealth level, it is crucial that we examine the extent to which this latter assumption is in fact warranted by the data.25 24The evidence on the effect of changes in wealth within sessions, however, is less conclusive. In an analysis of some of the subjects of their pilot study, Mosteller and Nogee found at least some evidence that the greater the amount of money "on hand," the greater the propensity to gamble [ One characterization of how such behavior systematically violates the independence axiom involves comparing the class of utility functions which rank a, over a, with the class of functions which rank a3 over a4. Note that the prospects a, and a, respectively stochastically dominate27 a4 and a3, and recall that a utility function U() ranks a, over a-, (a3 over a4) if and only if [.01 U(w) -.11 U(w + 1M) +.1OU(w + 5M)] is negative (positive), or equivalently, if and only if receiving $1 M with certainty is preferred (not preferred) to a 10/11 chance of $5M. Thus, in evaluating the change from a, to a2, the typical individual acts as if using a utility function which is more risk averse than the one "used" to evaluate the change from a4 to a3. An analysis of the above cited evidence of Kahneman and Tversky, Hagen, and MacCrimmon and Larsson similarly reveals a tendency for individuals to violate the independence axiom by ranking the stochastically dominating pair of prospects "according to" a utility function which is more risk averse than the one "used" to rank the stochastically dominated pair. 28 An alternative characterization of such behavior, in a form more directly comparable to the independence axiom, involves the notion of the "conditional certainty equivalent" of a prospect. Returning to Figure 3 , define the prospect a* as a 1/11:10/11 chance of winning $0 or $5 M respectively, and let E be an event with probability .11. Then the prospects a,, a2, a3, and a4 have the same distributions as the compound prospects which respectively yield $1 M, a*, a*, and $1M if E occurs, and $1M, $1M, $0, and $0 if -E occurs. It is clear that the independence axiom requires that the conditional certainty equivalent of a* in E, that is, the amount which the individual would, ex ante, just be willing to substitute for a* if E occurs, be independent of what would ensue if -E were to occur. However, the typical preference for a, over a2 and a3 over a4 implies that the conditional certainty equivalent of a* in E is less than $1 M when -E yields $1 M with certainty and greater than $1 M when -E yields $0. A similar analysis of Kahneman and Tversky [ 
46, Problems 1 & 2] and MacCrimmon and Larsson
[57, pp. 360-369] (i.e. that portion of the above cited evidence which can be formulated in this framework) also reveals the general property that, for a given event E and prospect a*, stochastically dominating shifts in the conditional distribution of wealth in -E will lower the conditional certainty equivalent of a* 27Throughout this paper, "stochastic dominance" refers to first order stochastic dominance (see Hadar and Russell [37] ).
28Note that in some of these examples the vectors of changes in the probabilities of the payoffs between each pair are not identical (as in the Allais Paradox) but rather scalar multiples of each other, a fact which has no bearing on the applicability of the above type of calculation. in E. Thus, contrary to the precepts of the independence axiom, the more that individuals stand to lose if the event E occurs (that is, the better off they would be in -E), the more risk averse they become in evaluating a given risky prospect a* in E. Equivalently, individuals are less risk averse toward a given prospect a* in E if E is the "preferred event" (i.e. when -E involves low outcome values) than when E is not the preferred event (i.e. when -E involves high outcome values). 29 A . While this phenomenon would clearly be a testimony to the normative appeal of the axiom, it is irrelevant to the positive theory of behavior toward risk (would an insurance company base its estimate of the pedestrian fatality rate on the widely held belief that the individual, if reminded, would always choose to look both ways before crossing a street?). Finally, there is evidence that the ability of experimenters to talk subjects out of preferences which violate the independence axiom may not be due to its "intuitive appeal" so much as the subject's desire to conform with the explicit or implicit beliefs of the experimenter. MacCrimmon [56, pp. 9-11] and Slovic and Tversky [88] reported that, when presented with opposing written arguments, subjects whose initial choices conformed to the axiom were about as likely to change their preferences as subjects who initially violated it.30
Svstematic Violation of the Independence Axiom: Oversensitivity to Changes in Small Probabilities and the Subjective Expected Utility Hypothesis
The third important characterization of how the independence axiom is systematically violated, namely that, relative to expected utility maximization, individuals are oversensitive to changes in the probabilities of small probabilityoutlying events, may also be illustrated by the Allais Paradox. Note that the 291t is important to distinguish this type of behavior from that discussed in Section 2.1. Roughly speaking, the current aspect is that the individual's aversion to the riskiness of a* in E grows with a general rise in the payoff levels in -E, whereas the earlier aspect was that it drops if there is a uniform rise in the payoffs in E (i.e. a uniform rise in the payoff levels of a* itself).
3()Although in a similar study Moskowitz found that presenting subjects with opposing written arguments arid allowing them to discuss these among themselves led to a net decrease in the proportion of violations of the axiom, nevertheless 73 percent of the initial "Allais type" preference rankings expressed by subjects remained unchanged after the discussions [65, pp. 232-237, Table 6 common shift from a, to a2 and from a4 to a3 may be thought of as moving .10 units of probability mass from the outcome w + I M to the outcome w + 5M and moving .01 units of mass from w + I M to w. When the initial prospect is a,, the upward movement of the .10 mass is not enough to compensate for the downward movement of the .01 mass, and the shift is not preferred. However, when the initial prospect is a4, the outcome w is no longer such an "outlying event" of the initial distribution, since (relative to a,) its probability has increased from 0 to .89. As a result, the individual is no longer as sensitive to the .01 rise in the probability of this event (at the expense of the preferred event w + I M) and this downward movement of mass is now more than compensated by the upward movement of the .10 mass, so the shift (to a3) is preferred.
Alternatively (and as will be seen below, equivalently), changing the initial prospect from a, to a4 may be viewed as making the outcome w + 5M "more outlying" relative to w and w + I M, since, although the probability of this outcome hasn't changed, in moving from a, to a4 a probability mass of .89 has moved farther away from the outcome level w + 5M. Thus, with the outcome w + SM more of an outlying event in the distribution a4 than in a1, the individual is now more sensitive to changes in its probability, and the upward movement of mass from w + 1 M to w + 5 M is now more than enough to compensate for the downward movement from w + I M to w, so the shift becomes preferred. A similar analysis of the evidence of Kahneman and Tversky, Hagen, and MacCrimmon and Larsson cited in the previous section also reveals this general tendency for individuals to be "oversensitive" to changes in the probabilities of low probability-outlying events.
A second source of evidence that individuals violate the independence axiom via a systematic oversensitivity to the probabilities of low-probability events are the empirical fittings by both psychologists and economists of the so-called "subjective expected utility" models.3' Such models assume that the individual transforms the known set of objective probabilities { p' } of a risky prospect into their corresponding "subjective probabilities" (7T(pi)} (called "decision weights" by Kahneman and Tversky [46] ) and then maximizes the value of >ix1 -7T(p.) ("subjective expected value" or SEV) or the value of iU(xi) . 7T(p1) ("subjective expected utility" or SEU), where pi is the probability of the outcome value xi. Since the independence axiom requires that 7T(p1) be linear, empirical estimates of the 7T(pi) function would yield information regarding the nature of any systematic violation of the axiom.
Such studies have on the whole found that, relative to linearity, individuals overemphasize small probabilities and underemphasize large probabilities. Applications of the SEV model to a wide range of both experimentally and nonexperimentally generated data have consistently yielded estimated 7T(p) functions which are proportionately greater from small values of p than for large ones (see 31A systematic presentation and discussion of this class of models is given in Edwards [95, 96] designed to overcome this problem by obtaining joint estimates of 7T(p1) and U(xi) in the SEU model continued to reveal a preponderant tendency towards overemphasizing small probabilities relative to larger ones.32 Finally, in a somewhat different type of experiment designed to distinguish between behavior due to the curvature of the utility function and that due to exaggeration of small probabilities, Yaari [101] found that "acceptance sets" for bets were generally convex, which ruled out the possibility of convexities in the utility function, and implied that the risk loving behavior exhibited by seven of his seventeen subjects can only be explained (in the SEU framework, at least) by an exaggeration of the small probabilities of the favorable outcomes in these gambles. Although Rosett [71, 72] has subsequently argued that the experimental design in [101] was not sufficient to rule out the existence of convex portions of the utility function, he noted that his objection did not apply to Yaari This would reflect the fact that, as the probability of the outcome value xi approaches one, the probabilities of all other outcomes must go to zero, and as a result, the individual becomes increasingly sensitive to shifts which increase the probability of xi at the expense of these other outcome values. In other words, the effect of a given shift of probability mass from X to xi (which equals U(x1),g'(p1) -U(xj),g'(pi)) is large in magnitude when either pi 1 and p1 z O or when pi c O and p1 -1. exhibits many undesirable properties. Once 7T(p) is nonlinear, for example, behavior is no longer characterized by the shape of U( ) alone, and the main results of expected utility theory (such as the characterization of risk aversion by the concavity of U(-)) no longer apply. More important, however, is the fact that, except in the case when it reduces to expected utility, the SEU model is incapable of incorporating the property of monotonicity (i.e. a preference for stochastically dominating distributions) in the sense that any individual maximizing E U(x1) 7r(p1) with a nonlinear i7(p) function will necessarilv prefer some distributions to ones which stochastically dominate them.34 Similarly, unless 7T(p) is linear, no subjective expected utility maximizer can exhibit general risk aversion (i.e. aversion to all mean preserving increases in risk), even over restricted ranges of possible outcomes. 35 In the author's view, this intrinsic incompatibility of the SEU model with the plausible behavioral properties of risk aversion, and especially general monotonicity, makes it unacceptable as a descriptive model of behavior toward risk.
It is useful to keep in mind the distinction between an oversensitivity to changes in the probabilities of small probability events and any tendency, under conditions of uncertainty rather than risk, to overestimate the probabilities of rare events. Since in this section and the preceding one we have treated behavior in situations where the individuals are told the relevant probabilities, this latter tendency, while it may exist, is irrelevant to the behavior considered here. Similarly, note that the principle of oversensitivity to changes in the probabilities of small probability-outlying events is not contradicted by the fact that individuals often tend to neglect altogether (i.e. treat as impossible) events of very low probability (see the references cited in Arrow [6, p. 14] and Samuelson [82, pp.
39-40])
. The neglect (for all practical purposes) on an increase in the probability of disaster from 0 to .0000001 would only violate this principle if the same absolute increase in the probability of disaster was not neglected when the initial probability was .5000000.36 
TH-IE ANALYSIS OF GENERAL NONLINEAR PREFERENCE FUNCTIONALS
In this section we demonstrate the robustness of expected utility analysis to violations of the independence axiom by showing how the fundamental concepts, tools, and results of expected utility theory may be applied to the general case of an individual possessing a "smooth" preference ranking over alternative probability distributions over ultimate wealth. may be thought of as "locally expected utility maximizing" follows from the fact that differentiable functions are "locally linear," and that for preference functionals over probability distributions, linearity is equivalent to expected utility maximization. 44 The simplest example of such a nonlinear preference functional is the specifi- Theorem 2 has two important implications for the generality of expected utility theory, which follow from the "if" and "only if" parts of the theorem, respectively. The first is that researchers, who in order to study the behavior of risk averters in various situations have modelled them as expected utility maximizers with concave utility functions, are likely to have proven results which are also valid in the more general case of smooth preferences. The second is that concavity of a cardinal function of wealth is a complete characterization of risk aversion, in the sense that anv risk averter must possess concave local utility functions, whether or not he or she is an expected utility maximizer. Thus, the researcher who would like to drop the expected utility hypothesis and study the nature of general risk aversion can apparently work completely within the framework of expected utility analysis.
Smooth Preferences and the "Local Utility

Behavioral Equivalencies
Besides its elegant characterizations of types of behavior in terms of mathematical properties of the utility function, another of the useful aspects of expected utility theory is the behavioral equivalencies it implies. Indeed, it is only those theorems which relate various types of behavior which are ultimately meaningful, and the only reason one studies the behavior implied by, say, a concave utility function in some situation is because of the behavior it implies or to which it is equivalent in other situations.
It is in this respect, however, that the independence axiom would seem to be instrumental in deriving results in expected utility theory. For the independence axiom is essentially a global restriction on preferences, as it implies that the local utility functions at all distributions F() in D [O, M] are identical. Thus, for example, knowing that an individual is averse to small mean preserving spreads about all certain (i.e. degenerate) distributions implies that the common local utility function is concave, which by Theorem 2 implies that the individual is averse to increases in risk about all initial distributions. Clearly, however, such a result no longer holds when the independence axiom is replaced by the local assumption of smoothness of preferences.
Nevertheless, it is possible to prove various behavioral equivalencies in the general case of smooth preferences and, as with Theorems I and 2, although these results do not require the independence axiom. they do follow the basic structures of the corresponding expected utility results. As a first example, consider again the expected utility result that aversion to all mean preserving increases in risk is implied by the local condition of aversion to all mean preserving spreads about certain (degenerate) distributions and the global restriction imposed by the independence axiom, which requires that if F*(.) is weakly preferred to F( ), then the distribution (1 -p)F**(.) + pF*(-) will be weakly preferred to (1 -p)F**(.) + pF( ), for arbitrary p, F, F*, and F**. Together these conditions imply (but are not implied by) the condition that for arbitrary p, F, and F**, the distribution (1 -p)F**( ) + pGLtl ( ) is weakly preferred to (1 -p)F**(.) + pF(.) (where fy is the mean of F), i.e. in any compound lottery, the individual would always prefer to substitute (ex ante) the mean of any of the possible risky prizes for the risky prize itself. Note that this last condition requires merely that the conditional certainty equivalent (see Section 2.4) of the distribution F always be no greater than its mean, and not that it necessarily be some constant value independent of p and F**, as does the independence axiom. The following theorem shows that in the case of behavioral equivalencies as well, the expected utility result provides the complete structure of the corresponding more general result, but that the sort of global equality condition imposed by the independence axiom may be replaced by the weaker requirement that the appropriate qualitative condition (i.e condition (i) of the theorem) hold throughout. Proceeding similarly, we define the "conditional demand for a risky asset" as the value of a which yields the most preferred distribution in the set {(l -p) F** + pF( I -a)r+ al I a E R 1 },47 where r is a positive constant and z a nonnegative random variable with mean greater than r, i.e. as the optimal proportion of a portfolio to place in the risky asset when there is some probability (1 -p) that for exogenous reasons (such as bankruptcy) the distribution of wealth will be F**(-) regardless of the composition of the portfolio. While the independence axiom requires that such conditional demands be a constant independent of p or F**, we require merely that the conditional demands for one individual always be no greater than the corresponding ones of the other individual, regardless of whether these conditional demands vary with p or F* *.
47Where F( I -a)r+az( ) stands for the distribution function of (I -a)r + ai, etc.
In order to confine our study of asset demand to the case of "regular" optima, we adopt the following condition-a generalization of the condition that indifference curves in the (a, pt) plane be upward sloping and bowed downward which serves to rule out both risk lovers and "plungers" as in the classic study of Tobin [ 
(ii) For all F(*) E D [0, M], U(x; F) is at least as concave a function of x as U*(x; F) (i.e. for all F, U(x; F) is a concave transform of U*(x; F)), so that if these functions are twice differentiable in x, then -U, ,(x; F)/ U,(x; F) -U {(x; F)/ U* (x; F) for all x, where subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to x. (iii) If the distribution F*(-) differs from F(-) by a simple compensated spread from the point of view of V*(.) (see Section 2.1) so that V*(F*) = V*(F), then V(F*)_--V(F).
If Thus the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, when applied to the local utility functions, yields a necessary and sufficient condition for one individual to 48This condition ensures that preferences are either (i) strictly monotonic in a or (ii) admit of a unique optimum value of a and are monotonically increasing in a below this optimum value and monotonically decreasing in a above it.
49Note that special cases of conditions (i) and (iv) are that the unconditional certainty equivalents are higher for V() and that the unconditional demands for the risky asset are higher for V*() respectively. be more risk averse than another, so that in particular, expected utility results involving the Arrow-Pratt measure as a measure of comparative risk aversion will typically apply to any pair of individuals with smooth preferences. Similarly, the Arrow-Pratt measure is evidently a sufficient tool for the analysis of comparative risk aversion in the general case. The results of this section suggest that much of the rest of expected utility analysis may be similarly generalized.f
TIlE SHIAPE OF THlE INDIVIDUJAL PREFERENCE FUNCTIONAL
In this section we present a pair of hypotheses concerning the shape of the individual preference functional and show that these hypotheses are consistent with, and in many cases actually imply, each of the aspects of behavior discussed in Section 2. It is important to note that Hypothesis I does not imply "decreasing absolute risk aversion in wealth" as it would if the individual were an expected utility maximizer. The willingness of an individual to insure against small risks about a certain wealth level c, for example, is given by -Ul (c; G(.)/ U,(c; Go,), so that the effect of a wealth increase on this willingness to insure also depends on how this term is affected by changes in its second argument Gj() (see Machina [58] ).
The Hypotheses The following hypotheses describe (I) the typical shape of a local utility function about a given initial distribution and (II) how the local utility function changes when evaluated at different initial distributions, that is, how U(x;
F
Insurance, Lotteries, and Skewness Preference
The types of behavior discussed in Section 2.1 all pertain to the individual's ranking of alternative shifts from an initial probability distribution over ultimate wealth. In this section we show that, when the alternative shifts are small enough. each of these types of behavior is consistent with or implied by Hypothesis I. Although Hypothesis I only suggests and is not strong enough to imply that such behavior extends to "large" shifts, the less the preference functional deviates from linearity (i.e. the less the shape of U(; F) depends on F) the more this will tend to be the case as well.
As seen in 'There is of course a third case which satisfies Hypothesis I, namely a local utility function which is everywhere convex and has a nonincreasing Arrow-Pratt term. Since such a case implies that the individual prefers all small increases in risk, we shall not consider it further. The discussion in Section 4.4 below, however, will apply to this case as well.
s Note that this would be true even if the initial distribution of wealth were nondegenerate, provided that the outcome of the lottery and the event to be insured against were independent of the initial distribution of wealth. F1 , F2) , then the individual will rank F3 and F4 as if using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function which is no less risk averse than the one "used" to rank F, and F2. Thus, if F2 differs from F1 by a simple compensated spread, then F3 will be weakly preferred to F4. On the other hand, if F4 differs from F3 by a simple compensated spread, then F2 will be weakly preferred to F1.
The second type of behavior discussed in Section 2.4 concerns the "nonindependence" of the conditional certainty equivalent of a risky prospect F(-) in an event E with respect to the conditional distribution of wealth in -E. In particular, it was observed that stochastically dominating shifts in this latter distribution tended to lower the conditional certainty equivalent of F in E.
The third characterization of how individuals systematically violate the independence axiom, discussed in Section 2.5, was that, relative to expected utility maximization, individuals are oversensitive to changes in the probabilities of low probability-outlying events. Recall from Section 2.5 that if xl < x2 < X3 are three outcome levels in [0, M], then any rightward shift of the probability mass of the initial distribution within the interval [x2,x3] may be said to change the initial distribution so as to make the event x3 "less outlying relative to the events x, and x2." Similarly, any shift of mass from the interval [x2,x3] to the interval [x3. M] may also be said to make the outcome x3 less outlying to xl and x2, since, for example, if the bulk of the initial distribution of wealth were near the level $10,000, moving probability mass from near this level to the outcome level $5,000,001 would make both this event as well as the event of winning five million exactly less outlying relative to events closer to the bulk of the distribution. Finally, a further rightward shift of mass within the interval [x3? M] may also be said to make x3 less outlying relative to xl and x2? since it changes the initial distribution in a way which makes x3 less of a "large outcome" relative to the new initial distribution (or alternatively, it results in x3 becoming closer to the "center" of the new distribution, and farther from the "right edge"). We thus adopt the following definition. Our definition of the individual's sensitivity to changes in the probabilities of events is also motivated by the discussion of Section 2.5. If x1 < x2 < X3, define the "marginal rate of substitution between a shift of probability mass from x2 to xl and a shift of probability mass from x2 to X3" (abbreviated MRS(x2 -x* X1 x-, -> x3)) as the amount of mass which must be shifted from x2 to x, per unit amount shifted from x2 to x3 in order to keep the individual indifferent, when the amounts shifted are infinitesimally small. From equation (5), this marginal rate of substitution is seen to equal (U(x3; F) -U(x2; F))/(U(x2; F) -U(x,; F)) where F is the initial distribution.54 Marginal rates of substitution between other pairs of shifts of mass between the three outcome levels may be defined similarly.
It is clear that for an expected utility maximizer these marginal rates of substitution will not depend on the initial distribution F(.). We thus say that a given change in the initial distribution makes the individual "more (less) sensitive to changes in the probability of x3 relative to changes in the probabilities of xl and x," if the change raises (lowers) both MRS(x2 -> x I, x2 -* x3) and MRS(x2 x , * x3), that is, if a shift of mass from either xl or x2 up to x3 now requires a larger (smaller) shift from x2 to xl to leave the individual indifferent. Note that since these last two marginal rates of substitution will always differ by unity, we may define this effect in terms of its effect on MRS(x2 X* x 2,x 3) alone. Similarly, a change in the initial distribution makes the individual more (less) sensitive to changes in the probability of xl relative to changes in the probabilities of x2 and x3 if it raises (lowers) MRS(x2 -> x3,x2 -x1) (and hence MRS(x, ---xX3 x3 -_ x1)), so that a shift of mass from either x2 or x3 down to xl now requires a greater (lesser) compensating shift from x2 up to x3. Since MRS(x -x3, x2 -* xi)= l/MRS(x2-x1,x2--*x3), we may combine these notions and adopt the following definition. DEFINITION: If xI < X2 < x3, a given change in the initial distribution is said to both make the individual weakly more (weakly less) sensitive to changes in the probability of x 3 relative to changes in the probabilities of xl and x2 and make the individual weakly less (weakly more) sensitive to changes in the probability of xi relative to changes in the probabilities of x2 and x3 if it preserves or raises (preserves or lowers) the value of MRS(x2 -x I, x2 _ x3). 55 A final characterization of how the independence axiom is systematically violated in the special case of preferences over two-outcome distributions has been termed the "certainty effect" by Kahneman and Tversky [46] is mathematically well defined even though x2 may not lie in the support of F( ). In this case its behavioral interpretation may be seen to be the ratio of the amounts of probability mass which must be respectively shifted to xl and to x3 from some outcome value which is in the support in order to leave the individual as well off as if the same total amount of mass had been shifted to x2. 55Note that from the previous footnote this definition does not require that x2 lie in the support of the initial distribution. It is clear the Hypotheses I and II are not strong enough to ensure that the rightward shift in the local utility function induced by the change in initial wealth will be parallel and by the exact distance of c* -c. To the extent that this happens, however, the individual's ranking of alternative gambles about initial wealth will be exactly preserved. In any event, the two hypotheses interact to ensure that preferences over gambles are less dependent upon the level of initial wealth than in the case of either of the fixed Friedman-Savage utility functions of Figures 1 and 2 . In particular, it is quite possible for an individual with a fixed preference functional satisfying Hypotheses I and II to purchase insurance, purchase lottery tickets, and avoid small fair bets about all nonstochastic wealth levels. This would be the case whenever the local utility function in Figure 4b shifted so as to always keep the inflection point somewhat to the right of initial wealth (an example of such a preference functional is given in Section 4.5 below). Thus, for the purposes of explaining the behavior discussed in Section 2.3, the Markowitz assumption that shifts in initial wealth cause the entire linear preference functional to change may be replaced by the assumption that such shifts cause the linear approximation of a fixed nonlinear preference functional to change in the same qualitative manner. Finally, note that the two hypotheses imply that arbitrary stochastically dominating shifts in arbitrary nondegenerate initial wealth distributions will similarly cause the local utility function to shift rightward.
Besides the behavioral phenomenon of a relative invariance of gambling behavior to initial wealth, another potentially important set of behavioral observations which cannot be explained by Hypotheses I and II are the findings by some experimenters that individuals' expressed preferences over certain pairs of gambles can apparently be systematically reversed by increasing initial wealth by some amount and lowering each of the possible payoffs of the gambles (including zero) by the same amount, even though the two situations represent a choice over the same pair of distributions over ultimate wealth levels (see Kahneman Figure 1 must necessarily violate each of the following "reasonable,' and more to the point, commonly observed, types of behavior: (i) the amount that an individual with even minimal wealth would pay for a 1 /n chance of winning $nZ eventually declines in n (so that lotteries will tend to have more than one prize), (ii) the individual would not forgo any finite sure gain to take the St. Petersburg gamble, and more generally, will assign a finite certainty equivalent to any probability distribution over nonnegative' wealth levels, and (iii) there will exist a low enough positive probability p and a high enough payoff $ C such that the individual will prefer a sure gain of $C to a p chance of winning any arbitrarily large prize $Z.
Recall that in order to make the Friedman-Savage model compatible with these observations it was necessary to replace the terminal convex segment of the utility function with a bounded terminal concave segment.6' In this section we 591t is interesting to note that although Markowitz observed that his model implied that such a change in initial wealth and the payoffs could yield an immediate preference reversal, he felt that it was "plausible to expect the chooser to act in the same manner in both situations" and sought to "resolve this dilemma" by introducing a lag between wealth changes and the shifting of the utility function [ [35] , and the references cited in these articles. 61 Note that this adjustment is necessary regardless of whether it is assumed that the utility function shifts when initial wealth changes. ,a2), (a3,a4), and (a5,a6) other than (a1,a3,a5),   (a1,a4,a5), (a2, a3, a5), or (a2, a3, a6) .
A more general approach to testing hypotheses on preferences is to parametrize V(Q) and estimate it directly. Thus, for example, for the quadratic 62Note that this particular condition is slightly stronger than the corresponding condition (iii) listed at the beginning of this section.
63This is true since the shift from a5 to a6 is the same as from al to a2 and from a4 to a3, and since a5 stochastically dominates a, and a4. preference functional V(.) of equation (6), we have from equation (7) Hypothesis I thus implies that this maximum acceptable loss will be preserved or increased if xa and xh are lowered by a common amount, so that (in this sense, at least) society is at least as willing to expend resources in redistributing wealth among the poor than among the rich. Hypothesis II implies that, for fixed X(7 and X., society's willingness to redistribute wealth between these two individuals will be preserved or increased by an improvement in the absolute wealth levels of (any or all) other members of society, in contrast to the utilitarian case where this willingness is independent of the wealth levels of others.67 Together, as in Section 4.4, the two hypotheses imply that, compared with the utilitarian case of a fixed UQ ) function, society's notions of inequality or poverty are "relative" in the sense that the local social utility function will shift rightward in response to a general increase in wealth levels.
Related Work
Besides the work of Kahneman and Tversky [46] , recent years have seen a revival of interest in non-expected utility maximizing behavior. Although none of the following take the approach developed here, the reader is referred to Allais 
